Venture capital investments rarely follow a straight, predictable path. Instead, they move through distinct phases—moments where a company’s trajectory, risk profile, and market context shift in ways that require us to rethink fair value. Each stage demands a different lens, because what a market participant would pay (or expect) evolves as uncertainty unfolds. In this series, I’ll explore these valuation moments through the frameworks that guide our industry: IPEV , ASC 820

Founders often view >1x liquidation preferences as aggressive, but from a VC’s perspective, they’re simply a tool — and one that’s used sparingly. Most deals clear at a clean 1x. But in the moments when structure does  appear, it’s there for a reason: to balance expected risk when valuation and conviction aren’t perfectly aligned. And here’s the part founders rarely internalize: A 1x return is not a win for a VC. It’s not even neutral. It’s a loss. Returning capital with no u

In startup land, few terms trigger founders more than “multiple liquidation preference.”  The moment a VC asks for anything above 1x, the reflexive reaction is often: “They’re being greedy.” But like most things in venture, the reality is more nuanced — and, frankly, more interesting. I want to offer a different lens. Not to defend every term sheet ever written, but to broaden the conversation. Because sometimes a >1x preference isn’t greed at all. It’s information. 🧩 1. A H

Continuing from last week’s post on how to think about Enterprise Value in VC‑type, early‑stage companies, I want to push the conversation a step further and talk about calibration — a concept that sits at the heart of valuation in an ASC 820 / IPEV‑compliant framework. Calibration is one of those ideas that sounds abstract until you actually apply it. But in practice, it’s the discipline that keeps early‑stage valuation from drifting into storytelling. It forces you to anch

1. Early‑stage valuation celebrates what’s possible This is one of the rare places in finance where vision and artistry is a legitimate input. You’re valuing ingenuity, ambition, and the potential to reshape a market, not just the assets that exist today. 2. The absence of traditional metrics is a feature, not a flaw When revenue and profits aren’t yet the story, founders and investors can focus on insight, velocity, and vision. It relies on creativity and strategic clarity w

Over the past few posts, I’ve been unpacking fair value methodologies under IPEV and ASC 820 and how they apply to venture investments. Now feels like the right moment to zoom out and ask the bigger question: what is a company actually worth? More specifically, how should we think about enterprise value across different parts of the investment universe? In public markets and traditional private equity, the answer is almost comfortingly straightforward. These companies typical

1. A solid cap table strengthens every valuation approach 🔍 Whether using OPM, PWERM, or CVM, every method becomes more reliable when it’s built on accurate ownership data. 2. High‑quality inputs unlock high‑quality valuations 📊 Even the most advanced models are only as strong as the data behind them. Reliable valuations depend on clean, complete, and well‑structured information, starting with an accurate, up‑to‑date cap table. Without that, the integrity of the valuation f

I’ve spent a lot of time breaking down how VCs can approach fair value using OPM, PWERM, and CVM. Each methodology has its own logic, assumptions, and ideal use cases. But despite their differences, they all share a single foundational dependency that determines whether the output is meaningful or misleading: If your cap table isn’t accurate, your valuation isn’t accurate. This is the part of valuation work that often gets underestimated. It’s easy to focus on the modeling te

(This post is longer than the previous ones, but because OPM plays such a central role in fair value methodologies, I’m going to be especially thorough here.) As we continue our look at fair value methodologies for VCtype investments under IPEVand ASC 820, one method consistently rises to the top in conversations with practitioners. After more than 50 discussions with VCs, CFOs, controllers, and valuation professionals, the most frequently mentioned — and most frequently misu

Valuing early‑stage companies has always required judgment, but the 2025 IPEV Guidelines sharpen the boundaries around when certain methods could be used. One of the most important updates relates to the Current Value Method (CVM). Historically, IPEV allowed CVM when an exit was expected “in the near future.” The 2025 update tightens this significantly: ⚠️ CVM is now appropriate only when an exit is imminent (IPEV Dec 2025 – Page 41) This is more than a wording change — it’s

As we continue our dive into fair value methodologies, what qualifies, what doesn’t, and how to make sense of it all, PWERM stands out as one of the most approachable tools for venture backed companies working under ASC 820 and IPEV. It’s surprisingly intuitive once you get past the jargon. At its core, PWERM isn’t just about running numbers; it’s about mapping the real paths a startup might take and understanding what each one means for shareholders and fair value. VCs alrea

In previous posts, I’ve focused on what not  to use  when valuing early‑stage, venture‑backed companies under IPEV and ASC 820. We’ve covered why l ast price per share , cost , and inappropriate use of waterfall allocations  often fail to meet fair value requirements, especially when capital structures are complex or when market conditions and company performance have shifted since the last financing. Those approaches may feel intuitive, but they rarely reflect the economics

After digging into the most common valuation shortcuts in venture capital, a few clear truths emerge: 1️⃣ Cost is not fair value Cost is historical. Fair value is current. IPEV and ASC 820 are explicit: once new information exists, holding at cost stops being conservative and starts being misleading. 2️⃣ Last price per share ≠ portfolio truth LPPS reflects one deal, at one point in time. It ignores preferences, protections, optionality, and changes in performance or market

Continuing our mini-series on valuation myths in venture capital, we’ve already looked at cost and last price per share . Now let’s turn to another commonly used approach: the enterprise value (EV) waterfall. At first glance, the waterfall feels logical: start with an enterprise value, then allocate it down the capital structure according to preferences and rights. But here’s the problem: the “EV then waterfall” is not consistent with IPEV or ASC 820 fair value principles (

In Part 1 of our mini-series, we showed why cost ≠ fair value. Now let’s tackle another shortcut: using the last price per share (LPPS) from the most recent round as fair value. Why LPPS Misleads It’s just one round - not all the rounds. It ignores preferences and protections baked into that round and other rounds It treats all shares like common shares , which they’re not. It ignores upside potential across the cap table. At the end of the day, it’s simply the cost of the

This is the first post in our mini-series on valuation myths in venture capital . We’ll explore some of the most common shortcuts used in reporting and why they don’t align with global standards like the International Private Equity and Venture Capital Valuation (IPEV) Guidelines and ASC 820 (Fair Value Measurement under US GAAP). Let’s start with one of the most persistent misconceptions: using cost as a proxy for fair value. In venture capital, valuation is more than a tech

In venture capital, valuation isn’t just a math exercise—it’s a strategic lens into potential. While many still rely on cost, LPPS, and waterfall models, today’s reality demands more. Complex cap tables and early-stage uncertainty call for advanced methodologies like PWERM, OPM, CVM, hybrid models, and milestone-based calibration. We’ve put together a quick carousel to help demystify the shift from traditional to sophisticated valuation approaches—grounded in IPEV and ASC 820